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NON-TECHNICAL SUMMARY 
 
In the early modern literature on economic development, Kuznets first noted the apparent 
relationship between income distribution and growth.  He stressed that a rising household income 
inequality seemed to be a normal process –a "stylized fact.” Inequality seemed to first grow worse, 
and then improve with rising per-capita incomes.  There followed a sizeable literature on this topic, 
starting with Kuznets, Champernowne, and Tinbergen in the 1950s.  This literature has seen a recent 
revival.  Building on datasets released in the late-1990s, recent research focuses particular attention 
on the impact of globalization on inequality and poverty in the developing world.   
 
In this paper we analyze the impact of trade and tariffs on the observed cross-country variation in 
the household distribution of income.  We build on results of the literature on production and the 
functional distribution of income in the 2x2 and higher-dimensional manifestations of the factor-
intensity model of international trade to link import protection to variations in the household 
distribution of income. Working with a new dataset on inequality, we then examine cross-country 
variation in inequality with respect to import protection.  Results are fully consistent with the 
predictions of the factor-intensity model of trade.  Our regression results suggest that import 
protection makes income distribution worse for countries with labour-intensive production patterns -
- technically know as diversification cones.  This relationship shifts to one of falling inequality as 
incomes rise and we move to capital-intensive diversification cones.  The crossing-point is for the 
set of economies with a per-capita income of between $5500 and $8750 (in 1995 dollars).   Below 
this level, increased import protection tends to make gross household income inequality worse at the 
margin.   Above this range, import protection tends to reduce inequality.  Results also suggest that 
OLS-based cross-country inequality regressions might best be viewed with some suspicion, due to 
quality of data for countries at lower income levels and variability in variables at this income range 
left out of unconditional Kuznets-U regressions.   
 
Our results also have implications for the welfare consequences of trade policy.  If we work with 
Sen-type social welfare indexes, then increased inequality discounts the welfare benefits of 
improved incomes through the efficiency gains from trade.  It is in higher-income countries that 
higher import protection appears to improve the gross household distribution of income the most.  
Yet these are the same countries with well-developed social safety nets (at least vis-à-vis lower 
income countries), such that the adverse effects of inequality that accompany efficiency gains may 
be offset.  As such, current import protection patterns impose welfare costs related to inequality 
exactly in those countries least able to offset distribution losses through a well-functioning social 
safety net.   
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INTRODUCTION 
In the early modern literature on economic development, Kuznets (1955, 1963) first noted 
the apparent relationship between the household distribution of income and growth.  He 
stressed that rising income inequality seemed to be a normal process –a "stylized fact.” 
Distributions seemed to first worsen and then improve with rising per-capita incomes.  
There has since been a sizeable literature in development economics, starting with Kuznets, 
Champernowne (1953), and Tinbergen (1956).   
Taken together with the more recent literature on openness and growth, a logical 
development in the recent empirical literature has been the search for three-way linkages 
between openness, growth, and the personal/household distribution of income.1 This 
includes general empirical evidence on the impact of international trade on income 
distribution and poverty in developing countries (McCulloch, Winters and Cirera, 2001; 
                                                 
1 While the emphasis of this paper is on the personal and household distribution of income, there has also been 
a large recent literature on the role of trade in the evolution of the functional distribution of income.  See 
Richardson (1995), and Feenstra and Hanson (forthcoming). 
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Winters 2000).  It also includes the growing computational literature on the household 
impact of policy reform.  Along these lines, Devarajan and van der Mensbrugghe (2000) 
have examined the household impact of trade policy reform in South Africa, Hertel et al. 
(2000) have explored the impact of multilateral trade liberalization on poverty reduction, 
Ianchovichina et al. (2000) have examined reform and distribution in Mexico, Robillard et 
al. (2001) have examined the recent crisis in Indonesia, and Khan has focused on tax reform 
in Bangladesh (1997). 
The recent econometric work in this area draws on data developed by Deininger and 
Squire (1996).  Higgings and Williamson (1999) find evidence that demographical sources 
are the most important factor for explaining the distribution of income. They also find that, 
once one controls for demographic structure and openness to trade, there is strong evidence 
for Kuznets’ inverted U-curve. However, the evidence of a link between income distribution 
and openness is mixed. Dollar and Kraay (2000) conclude that the income of the poor tends 
to grow at the same rate as economy-wide income. In other words, in contrast to the 
Kuznets-U reported elsewhere in the literature (like Higgins and Williamson), their results 
suggest that economic growth does not cause a relative deterioration in the mean income of 
the poor. In addition, they find that the share of growth following from trade does not 
significantly affect the income share of the poor either.  Barro (2000) finds that inequality in 
developing countries is negatively correlated with economic growth, while Adams (2003) 
uses a new dataset to argue that growth is important for poverty reduction. 
In this paper we analyze the impact of trade and tariffs on the observed cross-
country variation in the household distribution of income.  We build on results of the 
literature on production and the functional distribution of income in the 2x2 and higher-
dimensional manifestations of the 2x2 trade model (Kemp 1956, Mussa 1979, Ethier 1982, 
Deardorff 1979, 1982) to link import protection to variations in the household distribution 
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of income.2 Working with a new dataset on inequality, we then examine cross-country 
variation in inequality with respect to import protection.  Results are fully consistent with 
the predictions of the factor-intensity model of trade.  Our regression results suggest that 
import protection makes income distribution worse for countries in labor-intensive 
diversification cones.  This relationship shifts to one of falling inequality as incomes rise 
and we move to capital-intensive diversification cones.  Results also suggest that OLS-
based inequality regressions might best be viewed with some suspicion. 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section develops a formal 
representation of inequality in general equilibrium.  We then explore linkages between trade 
policies, the pattern of production, and inequality.  This is followed by an econometric 
assessment of the linkages between trade policy and the observed pattern of inequality.  The 
last section offers a summary and conclusions. 
 
PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM 
We start with a dual representation of trade in general equilibrium for a single country.  
This involves adopting the following set of assumptions: 
· Rational behaviour by households and firms; 
· Complete and perfectly competitive markets; 
· Convex preferences, with neoclassical production functions; 
· Convex technology for a composite consumption good;  
                                                 
2 The theoretical literature closest to the present paper includes Bourguignon and Morrisson (1990) and 
Spilimbergo et al. (1999). Both studies use an ownership matrix to write a general function of the personal 
income distribution in terms of endowments, tariffs and the ownership structure. A related paper is Galor 
(1994). He includes tariffs in his general equilibrium Overlapping-Generations model, but centers his analysis 
on the redistributive effects of the tariff revenues.  He does not consider the efficiency and distributional 
effects caused by the tariffs. 
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· Identical and strictly quasi-concave composite good aggregation technologies 
across households. 
Given these assumptions, we can define the core general equilibrium system for demand 
and production on the basis of expenditure and revenue functions, with expenditure defined 
in terms of the composite consumption good.  Income distribution indexes (and social 
welfare) are then developed as a set of side equations from the core general equilibrium 
system. 
 
The Core General Equilibrium System 
We assume that all households consume the composite good c.  This means we can 
represent aggregate expenditure e as a function of aggregate consumption c and prices p.  
This is represented by equation (1).  
 
e( p,c) = c × f (p)  
 
(1) 
 
In equation (1), f ( p) is the homothetic price index for the composite good. 
 On the production side, we assume standard neoclassical production functions with 
constant returns to scale: )( jiii vgx = , where (.)ig is the production function for good i and 
jiv is the use of factor j in the production of good i. If we define unit input coefficients as 
jia then we also have: )(1 jii ag£ .  Endowment constraints are then å £
i
jiji vxa .  From 
these, we can then define the economy-wide revenue function with respect to goods prices 
and endowments, as in equation (2). 
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(2) 
 
From the envelope theorem and the properties of the revenue function r, factor incomes and 
goods production can be expressed in terms of the value of the partial derivatives of the 
revenue function, evaluated at the equilibrium set of prices:  
 
¶r( p,v)
¶v j
= w j = w( p,v) "j  
(3) 
¶r( p,v)
¶pi
= x i = x( p,v) "i 
(4) 
 
We are ultimately interested in making empirical comparisons across countries.  
Empirically, this implies taking actual world prices as given by the data, and characterizing 
individual countries within this set of world prices.  Taking equations (3) and (4) above in 
conjunction with the equations (1) and (2), we can write the open-economy general 
equilibrium system for production, consumption, and trade for an individual country as 
follows: 
hmvvpwpfc ht
hh "×+×= tw),()(  (5) 
m = c h × f p (p)
h
å - x( p,v) (6) 
e( p,c) = w(p,v) × v h + w t
ht × m( )
h
å  (7) 
p = P * +t =1+ t  (8) 
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In equations (5)-(8), we have assumed that a tariff of t  is imposed on imports from the 
world, while world prices are normalized to one.  The term htw  is the household share of 
tariff revenue, while v h  is the household ownership share of factors and c h is household 
consumption.  We will generally assume that the household share of tariff income is n-1 
where n indexes the number of households. Equation (5) sets the value of household 
consumption equal the household budget, equation (6) defines imports on which import 
tariff revenue is generated, equation (7) sets economy wide expenditure equal to receipts, 
and equation (8) defines the wedge between world and domestic prices.  Together, 
equations (5)-(8) define an equally dimensioned set of relationships and unknowns: 
c h,c,m, p . 
 
Household Inequality 
As noted earlier, both the older and the more recent literature on trade and the distribution 
of income have been focused on the functional distribution of income.  The functional 
distribution of income is also an important building block here for the representation of the 
household or personal distribution of income.  Starting with factor incomes s, they follow 
directly from the endowment stock and the properties of the revenue function, as 
represented by equation (9). 
s j = w jv j = rv j ( p,v) × v j  (9) 
 
In reduced form, the functional distribution of income F(s) is then an artefact of the 
equilibrium matching of preferences and the technology set, given our endowment vector.   
 
F(s) = F (p,v)  
 
(10) 
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The household distribution of income follows from the combination of factor incomes w j , 
the vector of endowments, and the household ownership share in factors of production, w j
h .  
It will also depend on the distribution of tax revenue (tariffs in the present context), again 
represented by a household share parameter, this one applied to import tax revenues.  This 
is shown in equation (11), which gives the basic definition of household income in terms of 
its primary components.  By substitution from equation (5), this is also shown as a function 
of equilibrium prices, the production technology set, and the endowment set. 
y h = w j × v j ×w j
h
j
å
æ 
è 
ç ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ ÷ + w t
ht × m
= rv j ( p,v) × v j × w j
h
j
å
æ 
è 
ç ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ ÷ + w t
ht × m
c h =
y h
f (p)
where  1 ³ w j
h ³ 0
and w j
h , wt
h
h
å =1.
h
å
 
 
(11) 
 
In reduced form, the household distribution of income F(y) is a consequence of 
endowments, the technology set, preferences, the endowment vector, and the ownership 
matrix of coefficients w j
h  ( W).  From equation (11) we thus have: 
 
F(y) = F(p,v,W)  
 
(12) 
 
 We introduce two inequality indexes to our analytical framework: the Gini 
coefficient IG  and the Atkinson index IA . Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) 
preferences yield the Atkinson inequality index directly as a natural metric for the income 
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distribution component of social welfare (see Atkinson 1970).  In this sense, Atkinson’s 
index maps naturally into a social welfare function and in particular, to Sen’s (1974) 
preferred definition of social welfare. In contrast, the Gini coefficient implied social welfare 
function is axiomatic, in that we do not have an obvious mapping, through aggregation, 
from individual preferences to an aggregate social welfare function.  This follows because 
the Gini coefficient (and hence the implied social welfare function) is rank sensitive.  The 
formal definitions of these inequality indexes are provided in equations (13) and (14). 
IA =1-
1
n
y h
y 
æ 
è 
ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ 
1-q
h
å
é 
ë 
ê 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
ú 
1
1-q
 
 
(13) 
 
IG =1+
1
n
-
2
n2 y
y1 + 2y 2 + ...+ ny n( ) 
 
(14) 
 
In equation (13), q  corresponds to the coefficient of relative inequality aversion assuming 
CRRA preferences. In equation (14) the Gini coefficient is defined as twice the area 
between the Lorenz curve and the 45-degree line, where we have arranged households so 
that y1 ³ y 2 ³ ... ³ y n .  
 We can also write the Atkinson and Gini indexes in terms of system fundamentals.  
Making a substitution from (9) into (13) and (14), we obtain equations (15) and (16).  
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n
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(16) 
 
where 
y
vr jv
j
j
×
=b , which is the national income share accruing to factor j.  
 
TARIFFS AND HOUSEHOLD INEQUALITY 
Generalized Effects 
From equations (15) and (16) above, inequality is a function of the first two moments of the 
household distribution of income.  This is especially obvious with the Atkinson index.3   
The impact of a tariff on the household income distribution follows from differentiation of 
equations (15) and (16).  This is shown in equations (17) and (18) below. 
 
                                                 
3 While the functional form is different, the social welfare functions underlying other income distribution 
indexes yield a similar result, though with different weights in the variance component of the welfare function.  
The CRRA function yields a particularly clear and parsimonious reduced form. 
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(17) 
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2
n
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j
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Recall that the term b j represents the national income share of factor j.  Note that we also 
have an inverse income weighting, by a factor of q , in equation (17) applied to induced 
changes in the deviation from the mean component of household income -- ( )1-- nhjj wb .  
The weighting of induced changes in income for the Gini index depends on the ranking of 
individual households on the relative income scale.  In both cases, the changes in income in 
turn depend on Stolper-Samuelson derivatives, and induced price changes that follow from 
tariff changes.  This set of induced price changes is expressed in equation (19), where the 
term 
db j
dt depends on system fundamentals and consequent Stolper-Samuelson 
relationships.  The last line of equation (19) expresses this relationship in elasticity terms.  
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Tariffs and Household Inequality in the Heckscher-Ohlin Model 
Consider the application of equations (17) and (18) to a standard two-factor, two-good 
Heckscher-Ohlin model.  If we apply the additional normalization that all households hold a 
claim on one unit of labour, then our inequality indexes can be manipulated to yield 
equations (20) and (21). (We have also assumed a neutral redistribution of the tariff 
revenue).  
 
¶IA
¶t = -n
-q
1-q bk (wk
h - n-1)[ ]+ n-1( )1-q
h
å
é 
ë 
ê 
ù 
û 
ú 
q
1-q
bk (wk
h - n-1) + n-1( )-q ¶bk ¶t
æ 
è 
ç ö 
ø 
÷ wk
h - n-1( )æ è ç 
ö 
ø 
÷ 
h
å  
å --÷ø
öç
è
æ×-=
h
h
k
kG nh
n
I )(
2 1w¶t
¶b
¶t
¶  
 
(20) 
 
(21) 
 
Inequality is purely a function of the allocation of capital in this model.  At the same time, 
the impact of the tariff is then a function of which sector is protected.  If protection leads to 
an increase in wages and a drop in capital income, inequality is reduced.  Alternatively, if 
capital income is protected, we will see a rise in inequality.   
On the basis of equation (20) and (21) we can summarize our discussion above with 
the following observations about import protection and inequality in a 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin 
economy. 
 
· Observation 1: In a labour-rich 2x2 Heckscher-Ohlin economy under the assumption 
that poorer households by definition derive income only or mostly from labour, then 
observed inequality as measured by the Gini or Atkinson indexes will be greater, as 
import protection in labour rich countries will help capital owners, who receive 
relatively low weight in equations (20) and (21). 
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· Observation 2:  In a capital-rich (developed) Heckscher-Ohlin economy, under the 
assumption that the poor receive only or mostly labour income, import protection 
within a Heckscher-Ohlin economy means a lower observed inequality as measured 
by the Gini or Atkinson indexes.   
· Observation 3:  When making comparisons across 2x2 countries at a given set of 
world prices (as will be the case for cross-section inequality regressions), 
Observations 1 and 2 can be reinterpreted as saying that tariffs will be linked to 
greater observed inequality in capital-poor countries and less inequality in capital-
rich countries. 
 
While Observation 3 has empirical appeal, the classic 2x2 model is actually problematic 
when we confront it with real data.  Countries present a range of relative endowments, 
while we might reasonably expect the global trade matrix to include more than two broad 
classes of goods.  Following Deardorff (1979), if we assume Heckscher-Ohlin technologies 
and a range of goods, we can then rank goods by their relative factor intensities in 
production. Countries in turn can be ranked by their location in a chain of product 
diversification cones. More labor intensive countries will be located in diversification cones 
characterized by more labor intensive goods. We can then generalize Observation 3 to allow 
for a continuum of goods and factor intensity rankings. 
 
· Observation 4:  Assuming a Deardorff-type continuum of goods, then when making 
comparisons across countries within a given diversification cone, at a given set of 
world prices higher tariffs will be linked to greater observed inequality in cones 
occupied by capital-poor countries and less observed inequality in cones occupied 
by capital-rich countries. 
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· Observation 5: Assuming a Deardorff-type continuum of goods, as we move across 
diversification cones from more labour-intensive to more capital-intensive goods, 
the marginal impact of a tariff on inequality will fall.   
 
ECONOMETRICS 
Data 
We turn next to an empirical examination of the linkages between import protection and the 
household distribution of income. Almost exclusively, the current literature on openness 
and household inequality is built on the Deininger and Squire (1996) dataset. This dataset 
mixes inequality indexes drawn from income surveys, expenditure surveys; surveys based 
on net- and gross- incomes; and household and individual reference units. The same is true 
of the household distribution data reported by the World Bank (World Development 
Indicators) and the United Nations (Human Development Report). The assumption is that 
different income concepts and reference units are broadly comparable. Actually though, it 
turns out that they are not, and in many cases they do not even convey the same broad 
information set4.   
In our data we control for comparability between different sources of household 
distribution data.  To avoid measurement error problems, we therefore work with inequality 
series that combine comparable definitions. To be consistent with our theoretical 
framework, we use inequality data that we have either estimated directly from gross income 
household survey data, or that are reported as coming from gross income household surveys 
(where the underlying share data was not available)5.  We have two indexes of inequality, 
                                                 
4 Atkinson and Brandolini (2001). 
5 We take the inequality data from the World Income Inequality Database (2000). 
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the Atkinson index6 and the Gini coefficient.  Because the Gini coefficient is commonly 
reported from household surveys, even when the share data is not supplied, we have a 
broader sample of countries with estimated Gini coefficients.  These data are shown in 
Table 1. Values are centred on 1994 (though inequality indexes are taken from the nearest 
available year in a 4-year span before and after 1994).  Per-capita income in the sample, in 
1995 dollars, ranges from $532 (China) to $40,515 (Japan).  The mean per-capita income is 
$10,774.  The trade-weighted tariff for the sample ranges between 0 percent (Hong Kong) 
and 43.7 percent (Thailand), with a sample average duty of 9.9 percent.  The mean Gini 
coefficient from our gross household data is .40, with a maximum and minimum value of 
.62 (South Africa) and .22 (Slovakia).  The mean Atkinson index from our gross household 
data is .23, with a maximum and minimum of .53 (South Africa) and .08 (Ukraine).7  
 
Regression Model and Results 
As a starting point, we specify a reduced-form relationship between income level and 
inequality, formally known as a Kuznets-type inverted-u relationship.  In specifying a 
reduced form for inequality in this way, we are building on a broad empirical literature.8  To 
this, we add an indicator of the trade-weighted import duty. We also include an interaction 
term between duties and income levels, to reflect the possible role (as reflected in 
Observations 3 and 5) that relative development levels may play in the interaction between 
import tariffs and the distribution of income.   
                                                 
6 We use q=1 
7 These data are part of a larger project aimed at evaluating the impact of household data comparability 
problems on the current empirical literature on globalization, distribution of income, and poverty.  See 
Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2004). 
8 See Kanbur (2000) for a recent survey.  Following Higgins and Williamson (1999), we can distinguish two 
versions of the Kuznets hypothesis in the literature. The original (strong) version presented by Kuznets (1955), 
states that labor demand steers income inequality during the development process.  On the other hand, the 
weak version stressed in the more recent literature recognizes that other factors can also be involved, and that 
these can reinforce or offset the basic demand forces at play.   Deininger and Squire (1996,1998) do not find 
support for the unconditional Kuznets curve, while Higgins and Williamson (1999), also using the Deininger 
and Squire data set, find support for the weak Kuznets hypothesis. 
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Formally, our estimation equation is as follows: 
 
[ ] iiiPCITiTiPCIiPCIoi TyTyayaaLI egg +××+×+×+×+= *
2
2  
 
(22) 
 
where LIi  is a logistic transformation of the inequality index I for country i, y i is the log of 
per-capita income, Ti is the weight-average tariff on merchandise imports, and ei is the error 
term. 
Table 2 first presents basic OLS results.  The signs on coefficients are all as 
expected. However, coefficient estimates are insignificant for the tariff terms in the Gini 
coefficient regressions, while the Gini and Atkinson regressions both provide relatively 
poor fits to the inequality data.  In this sense, initial results are consistent with the broad 
literature in this area.  In other words, they are disappointing and offers mixed results.  
However, there is good reason to be suspicious of OLS results in this context, both in 
columns A and B in Table 2, and also in the literature in general.  It is pretty well 
recognized that data from low-income countries tend to be of poorer quality that data from 
the OECD countries.  In other words, we should expect that low-income country data tend 
to be noisier.  Columns A and B report Chi-squared test statistics for the hypothesis of 
homoskedasticity, weighed against the alternative hypothesis of variance inversely related 
to level of development as proxied by income level.  These results point strongly to 
heteroskedasticity, and hence to the preferability of weighted regressions.  It is also worth 
recalling that the Gini and Atkinson indexes are based on the same set of income survey 
results.  As such, the error structure of the Gini-based observations may tell us something 
about the error of the error-based regressions.  As such, we may improve the accuracy of the 
our estimates of coefficient variance by estimating the two equations jointly. 
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The results of weighted SUR regressions are reported in columns C (Gini) and D 
(Atkinson) of Table 2.  These estimates address both the heteroskedasticity issue, and the 
joint nature of the calculation of the Gini and Atkinson indexes.  The results for all 
coefficients have the expected sign, and are highly significant -- in the .001 to .002 range.  
The import-protection coefficients suggest import protection makes the distribution of 
income worse at the margin for countries in labor-intensive diversification cones, while this 
relationship shifts to one of falling inequality as incomes rise and we move to capital-
intensive diversification cones.  In other words, relative openness helps to improve 
inequality for the least developed countries.  As such, the basic pattern is consistent with 
our discussion of a Heckscher-Ohlin world with a continuum of goods.  It fits the prediction 
of factor-intensity based trade theory about the linkage between development level, 
protection, and the observed household income distribution. 
To help interpret these results, Figure 1 plots the estimated marginal impact of a 
change in the tariff on inequality for the countries in our sample using the Gini coefficient 
and Atkinson index estimates from columns C and D of Table 2.  This involves the 
combined effects of coefficients Tg  and PCIT *g .  Technically, as the regressions are in logs, 
this represents an estimate of the elasticity of the logistic transform of the Gini coefficient 
or Atkinson index with respect to a change in the power of the tariff T=(1+t).  The turning 
point for the index is at a per-capita income of between $5,474 (Gini coefficient) and 
$8,780 (Atkinson).  Recall that the Gini coefficient is more sensitive to redistribution in the 
middle-income ranges, while the Atkinson index is more sensitive to redistribution at the 
extremes.  The turning points for the different indexes hence relate to inequality more in the 
middle of the income distribution (Gini) or at the upper vs. lower extremes (Atkinson).  For 
countries below this income range, higher import protection is associated with marginal 
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increases in observed income inequality. For countries above this level, relatively high 
import protection implies marginal reductions in observed inequality.9   
 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we explore the relationship between import protection and the observed cross-
country pattern of the household distribution of income.   The theoretical linkages between 
import protection and the functional distribution of income (i.e. factor rewards) are well 
developed in the literature. Because the functional distribution of income is the first step in 
mapping import protection to the household/personal distribution of income, the existing 
functional distribution literature also provides insight into how import protection, through 
variations in ownership patterns in conjunction with Stolper-Samuelson effects, ultimately 
impacts the household distribution of income. 
 On the theoretical side, our contributions in this paper follow from an explicit 
general equilibrium formalization of linkages between import protection and standard 
measures of household income distribution.  These inequality derivatives yield predictions 
for patterns in the observed variation in trade protection, level of development, and the level 
of inequality across countries.  On the empirical side, we then work with a set of 
comparable inequality indexes (i.e. controlling for income definitions and survey units) to 
test these predictions.  To do this, we add trade policy indicators to a set of standard 
Kuznets-U type inequality regressions.  For the present exercise, which is focused on 
transmission from functional to household income patterns, gross income survey data has 
been used.   In addition to the basic pattern of results (inequality-tariff linkages), our 
                                                 
9 Burgess (1976) reaches a similar conclusion for the United States, which is obviously one of the high-income 
countries in our sample. Working with input-output coefficients and a generalized Leontief structure, Burgess 
concludes that higher tariffs raise real wages with respect to the United States. 
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estimates also point to potential estimation problems with OLS-based unconditional 
Kuznets inequality regressions. 
Regression results point to a highly significant pattern in the data fully consistent 
with the theoretical impact of tariffs on inequality in an n-good Heckscher-Ohlin world.  
While consistent with the predictions of theory, the pattern that emerges is not fully 
consistent with recent anti-globalization rhetoric.  We find that in the lowest-income 
countries, relatively high import protection is associated with observations of greater 
inequality.  It is in higher-income countries that higher import protection appears to improve 
the gross household distribution of income the most.  As such, current import protection 
patterns impose welfare costs related to inequality exactly in those countries least able to 
offset distribution losses through a functioning social safety net. 10  
                                                 
10 In addition, if one takes distribution as an important component of social welfare, along the lines of 
Atkinson and Sen, then the implications for numerical analysis of trade policy appear to be first- rather than 
second-order in developing countries.  Crude calculations by the authors not presented here, working with the 
estimated coefficients from the inequality regressions, suggest that in some cases adjusting trade policy 
assessments for distribution impacts may yield welfare effects on a par with those linked to efficiency 
currently stressed in the computational literature on trade policy.   
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TABLE 1, COUNTRY DATA  
 
country 
Gini 
coefficient 
Atkinson 
index 
per-capita 
income 1994, 
in U.S. dollars 
trade 
weighted 
import tariff 
AUS Australia 0.440 0.317 20,190 9.7 
BEL Belgium 0.318 0.171 26,705 7.0 
BLR Belarus 0.284 0.128 2,172 10.5 
BRA Brazil 0.595  4,299 17.0 
CAN Canada 0.350 0.213 19,366 8.0 
CHL Chile 0.556 0.390 4,212 10.9 
CHN China 0.368 0.213 532 40.6 
COL Columbia 0.580 0.367 2,326 12.4 
CRI Costa Rica 0.455  3,408 8.0 
DEU Germany 0.349 0.197 29,645 7.0 
DNK Denmark 0.289 0.162 33,701 7.0 
DOM Dominican Republic 0.490  1,482 17.7 
ECU Ecuador 0.530  1,563 8.5 
ESP Spain 0.330 0.169 14,528 7.0 
EST Estonia 0.378  3,063 0.5 
FIN Finland 0.295 0.161 24,473 5.0 
GBR Great Britain 0.404 0.298 18,772 7.0 
HKG Hong Kong 0.520 0.288 22,345 0.0 
HND Honduras 0.540  693 7.5 
JPN Japan 0.350  40,515 1.5 
LTU Lithuania 0.248  1,677 1.7 
LVA Latvia 0.240  1,940 2.6 
MDA Moldova 0.267  721 2.7 
MEX Mexico 0.477  3,406 12.2 
NLD Netherlands 0.316 0.172 26,372 7.0 
NOR Norway 0.302 0.120 32,553 4.9 
NZL New Zealand 0.401 0.270 16,056 9.4 
PAN Panama 0.560  3,006 11.0 
PER Peru 0.483  2,132 16.1 
PHL Philippines 0.462 0.302 1,061 20.4 
POL Poland 0.301 0.150 2,684 10.1 
PRY Paraguay 0.590  1,827 8.9 
ROM Romania 0.287  1,310 15.2 
RUS Russia 0.272 0.112 2,376 7.4 
SGP Singapore 0.422 0.260 23,017 0.0 
SVK Slovakia 0.215  3,220 6.2 
SVL El Salvador 0.530  1,612 8.7 
SVN Slovenia 0.281 0.119 9,053 12.1 
SWE Sweden 0.309 0.177 26,380 5.0 
THA Thailand 0.535 0.401 2,647 43.7 
TWN Taiwan 0.327 0.163 12,070 6.5 
UKR Ukraine 0.233 0.079 1,076 6.3 
USA United States 0.424 0.296 27,343 4.4 
VEN Venezuela 0.470  3,482 13.4 
ZAF South Africa 0.620 0.538 3,828 16.9 
Tariff data and income data are from the World Development Report (various issues).  Income 
distribution data are from Francois and Rojas-Romagosa (2004). 
 23 
TABLE 2,  REGRESSION RESULTS FOR KUZNETS’ CURVE WITH TARIFFS 
 
OLS estimates 
SUR estimates, 
weighted† 
A B C D 
Coefficients 
Logistic  
Gini 
Logistic 
Atkinson 
Logistic  Gini 
Logistic 
Atkinson 
a0  Intercept -8.7939
(-1.60)
-27.7185
(-2.58)**
-16.0398
 (-3.18)***
-28.6190
 (-3.27)***
aPCI  per-capita income 1.9179
(1.53)
5.7372
(2.39)**
3.4302 
(3.07)***
6.0795
(2.95)***
2PCI
a  squared per-capita income -0.1100
(-1.58)
-0.3088
(-2.35)**
-0.1855 
(-3.06)***
-0.3229
(-2.78)***
gT  Tariffs: T=(1+t) 5.5330
(0.61)
24.8864
(1.78)*
 
28.9728 
(3.80)***
33.5697
(3.95)***
gT *PCI  T*(per-capita income) -0.4243
(-0.35)
-2.6333
(-1.47)
-3.3658
(-3.64)***
-3.6970
 (-3.55)***
Heteroskedasticity tests 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg ‡ 
Szroeter’s test ‡ 
‡ Chi2, Prob>Chi2 w.r.t. income  
 
4.77, .029
4.43, .035
3.92, .048
2.68, .100
Regression statistics 
Observations for each index 
 
45 
 
27 
 
45 
 
27 
F, Pr>F 2.31, .075 2.78, .052 -57.07, 0.000 
R-squared for joint estimate .1873 .3359 0.9092 
Total observations 45 27 72 
Degrees of freedom 40 22 62 
 
† Regressions are weighted, on the assumption that variance is inversely related to per-capita income.  This is 
supported by heteroskedasticity tests shown in columns A an B.  This simply means that data are noisier in 
lower-income countries, due to a mix of measurement error and more variability at lower levels of income in 
factors reflected in the reduced form Kuznet’s curve.  According to Szroeter’s Chi-squared test statistic for 
homoskedasticity, the hypothesis of variance monotonic in per-capita income is preferred to homoskedasticity 
at the .035 level for the Gini-based Kuznets’ curve and at the .100 level for the Atkinson-based Kuznets’ 
curve.  The Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Chi-squared test statistic also supports heteroskedasticity in per-
capita income (at the .029 and .048 significance levels) for both regressions.  
 
Regression results shown are for unweighted OLS, and for weighted iterated SUR regressions with robust 
standard errors, where t- and z-test statistics are reported in parentheses. 
 
* means significant at the .10 level for a two-tailed test. 
** means significant at the .05 level. 
*** means significant at the .01 level. 
 
FIGURE 1 
 ESTIMATED MARGINAL IMPACT OF TARIFFS, ln(1+t), ON LOGISTIC INEQUALITY INDEXES 
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Estimated zero marginal effect at $5,474 for the Gini index
and at $8,780 for the Atkinson index.
